India’s rapid expansion of women-targeted direct cash transfers has altered the interface between social protection, women’s financial inclusion, and electoral competition. The central problem is not whether transfers provide immediate relief—they often do—but whether recurring cash assistance changes women’s durable economic position, productive capacity, and control over resources. This theoretical paper develops a secondary-data framework linking direct benefit transfer (DBT) design, women’s control over cash, household expenditure, productive investment, local economic multipliers, and electoral outcomes. A structured review of recent high-quality development, economics, gender, and political-economy research is combined with a proposed India state-year panel using official DBT, fiscal, labour-market, financial-inclusion, and election data. The paper proposes a Women’s Transfer-to-Enterprise (WTE) model and an Electoral Welfare–Economic Empowerment (EWEE) model, with women’s control over transfers, productive reinvestment, savings, labour participation, and electoral response as linked outcomes. The synthesis suggests that cash transfers should not be treated as inherently consumptive or inherently empowering: their effects depend on transfer size, regularity, women’s effective control, market access, complementary capabilities, and the time horizon used for evaluation. The paper argues for shifting policy evaluation from transfer delivery to post-transfer economic transformation. A redesigned transfer architecture that combines cash with savings, enterprise, skills, market access, and transparent fiscal rules could convert short-run welfare spending into a more durable women-led local economic cycle.