This study critically examined founders' syndrome and its implications on governance in Islamic cooperatives in Nigeria, including institutional accountability, independence of the Executive management (board), participation of members, and succession of leadership. It explored mechanisms that can mitigate the excessive influence of founders. It had two aims: to explore how the founders' syndrome affects governance in Islamic cooperative organisations and to critically review institutional mechanisms to enhance accountable, participatory, and sustainable governance. The qualitative research approach of critical documentary analysis was used. Most of the evidence was obtained from scholarly studies on Islamic cooperatives in Nigeria, with particular focus on the Zero Interest Cooperative in Lagos, Nigeria, cooperative governance, and founder syndrome, succession, and Islamic governance, and literature relevant to the subject was used as needed. The results showed that founder effects had played a role in organisational development, resource mobilization, and institutional continuity, but founder dependence also had led to a lack of substantive governance, a centralisation of authority, and a decrease in institutional independence and accountability. The analysis also revealed that strong governance, defined responsibilities, independent oversight, and good internal controls, as well as serious succession planning and a substantive Shura council, could be an impediment to founder dominance. Collective governance ought not to be replaced by founder leadership, the study concluded. This was important since it related the concept of founders' syndrome theory with Islamic governance principles and offered implications on how to enhance accountable and sustainable governance in Islamic cooperatives in Nigeria.